Addressing Covert Termination and Timing Channels in Concurrent Information Flow Systems

Deian Stefan, Alejandro Russo, Pablo Buiras, Amit Levy, John Mitchell, and David Mazières





Motivation

Web framework for integrating 3rd party apps



• Platforms restrict what data apps can see



• No guarantee what app can do with your data







• Platforms restrict what data apps can see



• No guarantee what app can do with your data





• Platforms restrict what data apps can see



• No guarantee what app can do with your data







• Platforms restrict what data apps can see



• No guarantee what app can do with your data





• Platforms restrict what data apps can see



• No guarantee what app can do with your data







• Platforms restrict what data apps can see



• No guarantee what app can do with your data





• Platforms restrict what data apps can see



• Platforms restrict what data apps can see

Platforms restrict what data apps can see

Platforms restrict what data apps can see

Platforms restrict what data apps can see

• Platforms restrict what data apps can see

• Platforms restrict what data apps can see

• Platforms restrict what data apps can see

Fundamental Problem

- Problem:
 - Read sensitive data with getUserMessages
 - Wrote to remote host with alertPaparazzi
- Solution:
 - Restrict who the app can communicate with depending on what data it has read

Alternative Approach Information Flow Control with LIO

- Label every object with a security level/policy *Label protects data by specifying who can read/write*
- Example security label lattice:

- Execute computations in LIO monad
 Records context "current" label
 I.e., tracks taint of computation
 - Restricts side-effects an app can perform
- Example (sending Bob a message):

0	
0	

- Execute computations in **LIO** monad
 - Records context "current" label
 - ► I.e., tracks taint of computation
 - Restricts side-effects an app can perform
- Example (sending Bob a message):

0	
0	

- Execute computations in **LIO** monad
 - Records context "current" label
 - ► I.e., tracks taint of computation
 - Restricts side-effects an app can perform
- Example (sending Bob a message):

- Execute computations in **LIO** monad
 - Records context "current" label
 - ► I.e., tracks taint of computation
 - Restricts side-effects an app can perform
- Example (sending Bob a message):

- Execute computations in **LIO** monad
 - Records context "current" label
 - ► I.e., tracks taint of computation
 - Restricts side-effects an app can perform
- Example (sending Bob a message):

- Execute computations in **LIO** monad
 - Records context "current" label
 - ► I.e., tracks taint of computation
 - Restricts side-effects an app can perform
- Example (sending Bob a message):

- Execute computations in **LIO** monad
 - Records context "current" label
 - ► I.e., tracks taint of computation
 - Restricts side-effects an app can perform
- Example (sending Bob a message):

- Execute computations in **LIO** monad
 - Records context "current" label
 - ► I.e., tracks taint of computation
 - Restricts side-effects an app can perform
- Example (sending Bob a message):

LIO Monad Preventing unwanted leaks

LIO Monad Preventing unwanted leaks

LIO Monad Preventing unwanted leaks

• Messenger app wishes to send broadcast message

sendMessages :: [User] -> Message -> LIO () sendMessages users message = doforM_ users \$ λ user -> sendMessage user message

• Messenger app wishes to send broadcast message

sendMessages :: [User] -> Message -> LIO ()
sendMessages users message = do
forM_users \$ λuser -> sendMessage user message

• Messenger app wishes to send broadcast message

sendMessages :: [User] -> Message -> LIO () sendMessages users message = doforM_ users \$ λ user -> sendMessage user message

• Messenger app wishes to send broadcast message

sendMessages :: [User] -> Message -> LIO ()
sendMessages users message = do
forM_users \$ λuser -> sendMessage user message

• Messenger app wishes to send broadcast message

Strawman: use discard to execute sensitive actions
Do not observe result in no leak!

Strawman: use discard to execute sensitive actions
Do not observe result in no leak!

Strawman: use discard to execute sensitive actions
Do not observe result in no leak!

Strawman: use discard to execute sensitive actions
 Do not observe result in no leak!

Strawman: use discard to execute sensitive actions
 Do not observe result in no leak!

Strawman: use discard to execute sensitive actions
 Do not observe result in no leak!

Strawman: use discard to execute sensitive actions
Do not observe result in no leak!

Strawman: use discard to execute sensitive actions
 Do not observe result in no leak!

... **discard** covertly leaks termination information.

Termination Attack

• Leak secret bit through non-termination

```
isOfInterest :: User -> Int -> LIO ()
isOfInterest victim n = do
discard $ do
messages <- getUserMessages victim
let user = recipient (message!!n)
when (user == "Brad Pitt") ⊥
writeToPublicChannel "boring"</pre>
```

If user matches: diverge in discard block Else: write "boring" to public channel

Termination Attack

- Address at the framework/system level
- Use different attacker model
 Termination-insensitive non-interference: *if a program terminates, then confidentiality and integrity of data is preserved*
- Don't address: very low bandwidth channel
 Leaks 1 bit per run

Adding Fire

- Threads are crucial to modern web frameworks
 Need to concurrently serve requests
- Viability of covert channel attacks
 - ► Termination attack leaks 1 bit per thread
 - Can leak data within same program
 - Permits attacks relying on internal timing

Internal Timing Attack

• Leak secret bit by affecting output ordering

```
isOfInterest :: User -> Int -> LIO ()
isOfInterest victim n = do
fork $ do delay 100
    writeToPublicChannel "y"
    Write race to
public channel
    discard $ do
    messages <- getUserMessages victim
    let user = msgDestination (message!!n)
    when (user == "Brad Pitt")$ delay 500
writeToPublicChannel "es"</pre>
```

- If user matches: write "y" first, then "es" Else: write "es" then "y"
- Analyze output: "yes" locate to contact with Brad Pitt

Solution: Threads Fighting fire with fire

- Decoupling discard computations
 Spawn new thread to execute sub-computation
 Immediately return a labeled future to thread
- Making LIO safe:
 - discard
 - + **lFork**: spawn new, labeled threads

+ **lWait**: force thread evaluation, first "raising" context label to read result and termination

Termination Attack

• Cannot leak bits through non-termination

```
isOfInterest :: User -> Int -> LIO ()
isOfInterest victim n = do
discard lFork $ do
messages <- getUserMessages victim
let user = recipient (message!!n)
when (user == "Brad Pitt") ⊥
writeToPublicChannel "clean"</pre>
```

If user matches: diverge in discard block
Always write "clean" to public channel

Internal Timing Attack

Always write "es" first, then "y"

Status of LIO

- Used in production system
- Formalized as call-by-name λ-calculus
 Support for thread spawning and joining with lFork and lWait
 - Support for mutable single-place channels
- Theorem: Termination-sensitive non-interference
 Informally: *Confidentiality and integrity of data is preserved even if threads diverge.*

- Covert channels closed by LIO
 Termination Internal timing
- What about external timing channel?

- Covert channels closed by LIO
 Termination Internal timing
- What about external timing channel?

- Covert channels closed by LIO
 Termination Internal timing
- What about external timing channel?

- Covert channels closed by LIO
 Termination Internal timing
- What about external timing channel?

- Covert channels closed by LIO
 Termination Internal timing
- What about external timing channel?

- Covert channels closed by LIO
 Termination Internal timing
- What about external timing channel?

- Covert channels closed by LIO
 Termination Internal timing
- What about external timing channel?

Thank you cabal install lio

http://gitstar.com/scs/lio

