


Hacking Blind

Andrea Bittau, Adam Belay, Ali Mashtizadeh,
David Mazières, Dan Boneh

Stanford University

Hacking buffer overflows



Crash or no Crash? Enough to build exploit



GET /blabla HTTP/1.0

HTTP/1.0 404 Not Found

GET /AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

connection closed



Don't even need to know what application is running!

Exploit scenarios:

1. Open source



2. Open binary



3. Closed-binary (and source)



Attack effectiveness

- Works on 64-bit Linux with ASLR, NX and canaries

Server	Requests	Time (mins)
nginx	2,401	1
MySQL	3,851	20
Toy proprietary service (unknown binary and source)	1,950	5

Attack requirements

1. Stack vulnerability, and knowledge of how to trigger it.
2. Server process that respawns after crash
 - E.g., nginx, MySQL, Apache, OpenSSH, Samba.

Outline

- Introduction.
- Background on exploits.
- Blind ROP (BRROP).
- Optimizations.

Stack vulnerabilities

```
void process_packet(int s) {  
    char buf[1024];  
    int len;  
  
    read(s, &len, sizeof(len));  
    read(s, buf, len);  
  
    return;  
}
```

handle_client()

Stack:

return address
0x400000

buf[1024]



Stack vulnerabilities


```
void process_packet(int s) {  
    char buf[1024];  
    int len;  
  
    read(s, &len, sizeof(len));  
    read(s, buf, len);  
  
    return;  
}
```

handle_client()

Stack:

return address
0x400000

AAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAA



Stack vulnerabilities

```
void process_packet(int s) {  
    char buf[1024];  
    int len;  
  
    read(s, &len, sizeof(len));  
    read(s, buf, len);  
  
    return;  
}
```

Stack:

return address
0x41414141

AAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAA

??



Stack vulnerabilities

```
void process_packet(int s) {  
    char buf[1024];  
    int len;  
  
    read(s, &len, sizeof(len));  
    read(s, buf, len);  
  
    return;  
}
```

Stack:

return address
0x500000

Shellcode:

```
dup2(sock, 0);  
dup2(sock, 1);  
execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0);
```

AAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAA

Stack vulnerabilities

```
void process_packet(int s) {  
    char buf[1024];  
    int len;  
  
    read(s, &len, sizeof(len));  
    read(s, buf, len);  
  
    return;  
}
```

Stack:

return address
0x600000

Shellcode:

```
dup2(sock, 0);  
dup2(sock, 1);  
execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0);
```

0x1029827189
123781923719
823719287319
879181823828

Exploit protections

```
void pro  
char  
int le
```

1. Make stack non-executable (NX)

```
re  
re  
return,
```

2. Randomize memory addresses (ASLR)

```
snrllcode.  
dup2(sock, 0);  
dup2(sock, 1);  
execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0);  
}
```


Stack:

return address
0x600000

0x1029827189
123781923719
823719287319
879181823828

Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)


.text:



Executable

```
dup2(sock, 0);  
dup2(sock, 1);  
execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0);
```


Stack:




Non-Executable

Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)

.text:



Stack:




A light blue rounded rectangular callout box with a black border, containing the following assembly code:

```
dup2(sock, 0);  
dup2(sock, 1);  
execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0);
```

A black arrow points from the top-right corner of this callout box to the stack location "0x800000".


Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)

.text:




Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)

.text: 0x400000




Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)

.text: 0x400000 + ??



Stack:



Exploit requirements today

1. Break ASLR.
2. Copy of binary (find ROP gadgets / break NX).
 - Is it even possible to hack unknown applications?

Blind Return-Oriented Programming (BRROP)

1. Break ASLR.
2. Leak binary:
 - Remotely find enough gadgets to call write().
 - write() binary from memory to network to disassemble and find more gadgets to finish off exploit.


Defeating ASLR: stack reading

- Overwrite a single byte with value X :
 - No crash: stack had value X .
 - Crash: guess X was incorrect.
- Known technique for leaking canaries.




Defeating ASLR: stack reading

- Overwrite a single byte with value X:
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
Defeating ASLR: stack reading

- Overwrite a single byte with value X :
 - No crash: stack had value X .
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- Known technique for leaking canaries.




How to find gadgets?

.text:





Stack:




How to find gadgets?

.text:





Connection closes

Stack:




How to find gadgets?

.text:





Connection closes

Stack:




How to find gadgets?

.text:




Connection hangs

Stack:



How to find gadgets?

.text:



Three types of gadgets

Stop gadget

```
sleep(10);  
return;
```

- Never crashes

Crash gadget

```
abort();  
return;
```

- Always crashes

Useful gadget

```
dup2(sock, 0);  
return;
```

- Crash depends on return

Three types of gadgets

Stop gadget

```
sleep(10);  
return;
```

- Never crashes

Crash gadget


```
abort();  
return;
```

- Always crashes

Useful gadget

```
dup2(sock, 0);  
return;
```

- Crash depends on return



Finding useful gadgets

0x401170

```
dup2(sock, 0);  
return;
```

Stack:

```
other
```


```
return address  
0x401170
```

```
buf[1024]
```

Crash!!

0x401150

```
sleep(10);  
return;
```



Finding useful gadgets

0x401170

```
dup2(sock, 0);  
return;
```

Stack:

```
0x401150
```


```
return address  
0x401170
```

```
buf[1024]
```

0x401150


```
sleep(10);  
return;
```

No crash




How to find gadgets?

.text:





Stack:




How to find gadgets?

.text:





Connection hangs

Stack:




How to find gadgets?

.text:




Connection closes

Stack:



What are we looking for?



What are we looking for?

write(int sock, void *buf, int len)

pop rdi
ret

pop rsi
ret

pop rdx
ret

call write
ret

AAAAA
buf[1024]

0x400000
ret addr

sock
rdi

0x500000
buf
rsi

0x600000
len
rdx

0x700000

Pieces of the puzzle

pop rsi
ret

pop rdi
ret

pop rdx
ret

call write
ret

stop gadget
[call sleep]

Pieces of the puzzle

The BROP gadget

```
pop rbx  
pop rbp  
pop r12  
pop r13  
pop r14  
pop r15  
ret
```

```
pop rsi  
pop r15  
ret
```

```
pop rdi  
ret
```


```
pop rdx  
ret
```

```
call write  
ret
```

```
stop gadget  
[call sleep]
```


Finding the BROOP gadget

Stack:





Finding the BROOP gadget

Stack:




Finding the BRROP gadget

Stack:



BRROP gadget



Connection hangs

Pieces of the puzzle

The BROP gadget

```
pop rbx  
pop rbp  
pop r12  
pop r13  
pop r14  
pop r15  
ret
```


```
pop rsi  
pop r15  
ret
```

```
pop rdi  
ret
```

```
pop rdx  
ret
```

```
call write  
ret
```

```
stop gadget  
[call sleep]
```



Pieces of the puzzle

The BROP gadget

```
pop rbx  
pop rbp  
pop r12  
pop r13  
pop r14  
pop r15  
ret
```


```
pop rsi  
pop r15  
ret
```

```
pop rdi  
ret
```

```
call strcmp  
ret
```



```
call write  
ret
```

```
stop gadget  
[call sleep]
```




Pieces of the puzzle

The BROP gadget



Procedure Linking Table (PLT)



Fingerprinting strcmp

arg1	arg2	result
readable	0x0	crash
0x0	readable	crash
readable	readable	nocrash

Can now control three arguments:
strcmp sets RDX to length of string

Finding write

- Try sending data to socket by calling candidate PLT function.
- check if data received on socket.
- chain writes with different FD numbers to find socket. Use multiple connections.

Launching a shell


1. dump binary from memory to network.
Not blind anymore!
2. dump symbol table to find PLT calls.
3. redirect stdin/out to socket:
 - `dup2(sock, 0); dup2(sock, 1);`
4. `read()` “/bin/sh” from socket to memory
5. `execve(“/bin/sh”, 0, 0)`

Braille

- Fully automated: from first crash to shell.
- 2,000 lines of Ruby.
- Needs function that will trigger overflow:
 - nginx: 68 lines.
 - MySQL: 121 lines.
 - toy proprietary service: 35 lines.

```
try_exp(data) → true  crash  
              false no crash
```

Attack complexity



of requests
for nginx