Outline

CS244b – Distributed Systems

Instructor: David Mazières **CAs:** Geoff Ramseyer, Geet Seethi

Stanford University

- Administrivia
- 2 Remote procedure call
- 3 Consensus in asynchronous systems

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Administrivia

- Class web page: http://cs244b.scs.stanford.edu/
 - All handouts, lecture notes are on line
- Please join edstem
 - Can ask questions by noon on lecture day to influence lecture
 - Also find teammates, delve into topics with more detail, etc.
- Each class will involve discussing papers
 - Print, read the papers before class
 - Class participation is required (or edstem if you have special dispensation not to attend)
 - You may get cold-called if you haven't participated in a few lectures
 - I will post discussion notes after lecture
- Zoom should work for SCPD (but please mute your mic)
- Please bring an $8.5" \times 11"$ name card to lecture
- Staff mailing list: cs244b-staff@scs.stanford.edu
 - Please email all staff rather than individual members

Assignments

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- Read papers before class
 - Don't take this lightly—should spend several hours reading
- Final project
 - Perform a small research project in teams of 1–4 students
 - Use ideas from papers we've discussed in class
- Schedule:
 - April 11: Form team (can use mailing list to find teammates)
 - April 18: Schedule meeting with me or CA to discuss project
 - Shortly after meeting: project title and one paragraph
 - May 27: Submit git repository, and revised title/paragraph
 - June 3: Submit paper on project (up to 6 pages)
 - June 7: Project presentations/demos (12:30pm-late)
- Grading primarily based on final project
 - Adjusted based on class participation

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Why study distributed systems?



- Most real systems are actually distributed systems
- If you want fault-tolerance or scalability
 - Must replicate or shard across multiple machines
- If you want systems that span administrative realms
 - Web sites, peer-to-peer systems, communication systems

Class topics

- Distributed programming models
- Dealing with failure, including Byzantine failure
- Scalability
- Techniques: Consensus, Replication, Consistency...
- Case studies: production systems at Google, Amazon, ...
- A few Blockchain mechanisms

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Remote procedure call (RPC)

- Procedure calls are a well-understood mechanism
 - Transfer control and data on single computer
- RPC's goal is to make distributed programming look like as much as possible like normal programming
 - Code libraries provide APIs to access functionality
 - RPC servers export interfaces accessible through local APIs
 - See [Birrell] for good description of one implementation
- Implement RPC through request-response protocol
 - Procedure call generates network request to server
 - Server return generates response
- Good example of how distributed systems differ...

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Procedure vs. RPC

Consider the following ordinary procedure:

bool add_user(string user, string password);

- Possible return values: true, false
- Now say you have an RPC version
 - Must somehow set up connections, bind to server, think about authentication, etc., but ignore all that for now
- What are the possible return values of add_user RPC?

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- What are the possible return values of add_user RPC?
 - 1. true
 - 2. false
 - 3. "I don't know"

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RPC Failure

- Normal procedure call has fate sharing
 - Single process: if callee fails, caller fails, too
- RPC introduces more failure modes
 - Machine failures at only one end (caller/callee)
 - Communication failures
- Result: RPCs can return "failure" instead of results
- What are the possible outcomes after failure?
 - Procedure did not execute
 - Procedure executed once
 - Procedure executed multiple times
 - Procedure partially executed
- Many systems aspire to "at most once semantics"

Implementing at most once semantics

- Danger: Request message lost
 - Client must retransmit requests when it gets no reply
- Danger: Reply message may be lost
 - Client may retransmit previously executed request
 - Okay if operations are idempotent, but many are not (e.g., process order, charge customer, ...)
 - Server must keep "replay cache" to reply to already executed requests
- Danger: Server takes too long to execute procedure
 - Client will retransmit request already in progress
 - Server must recognize duplicate—can reply "in progress"

Server crashes

Parameter passing

- Danger: Server crashes and reply lost
 - Can make replay cache persistent—slow
 - Can hope reboot takes long enough for all clients to fail
- Danger: Server crashes during execution
 - Can log enough to restart partial execution—slow and hard
 - Can hope reboot takes long enough for all clients to fail
- Can use "cookies" to inform clients of crashes
 - Server gives client cookie which is time of boot
 - Client includes cookie with RPC
 - After server crash, server will reject invalid cookie

- Trivial for normal procedure calls
- RPC must worry about different data representations
 - Big/little endian
 - Size of data types
- RPC has no shared memory
 - No global variables
 - How to pass pointers
 - How to garbage-collect distributed objects
- How to pass unions over RPC?

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Interface Definition Languages

- Idea: Specify RPC call and return types in IDL
- Compile interface description with IDL compiler. Output:
 - Native language types (e.g., C/C++/Java/go/etc. structs)
 - Code to marshal (serialize) native types into byte streams
 - Stub routines on client to forward requests to server
- Stub routines handle communication details
 - Helps maintain RPC transparency, but...
 - Still have to bind client to a particular server
 - Still need to worry about failures

C++ RPC-related systems in use today

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- XML or JSON over HTTP no IDL, hard to parse
- Cereal C++11 structure serializer
- Google protobufs + gRPC, Apache Thrift
 - + Compact encoding, defensively coded (protobufs)
 - + Good support for incrementally evolving messages
 - Complex encoding, no canonical representation
- Apache Avro self-describing messages contain schema
- Cap'n Proto, Google FlatBuffers
 - + Same representation in memory and on wire, very fast
 - Less mature, non-deterministic wire format, bigger attack surface
- XDR (+ RPC) used by Internet standards such as NFS
 - + Simple, good features (unions, fixed- and variable-size arrays, ...)
 - Big endian, binary but rounds everything to multiple of 4 bytes

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"Homework"

Write and run a simple distributed application using RPC

- Use any of the technologies from previous slide
- Or any other RPC system you like
- We won't grade it, but it will help with your project

Case study: XDR

```
enum MyEnum { NO, YES, MAYBE };
struct MyMessage {
  string name<16>;
                    /* up to 16 characters */
 string desc<>;
                    /* up to 2^32-1 characters */
 opaque cookie[8]; /* 8 bytes (fixed) */
                    /* 0-16 bytes (variable-length) */
 opaque sig<16>;
                    /* Unsigned 32-bit integer */
 unsigned int u;
 hyper ii;
                    /* Signed 64-bit integer */
                    /* Another user-defined type */
 MyEnum me;
 int ia[5];
                    /* Fixed-length array */
 int iv<>;
                    /* Variable length array */
                    /* Up to 5 ints */
 int. iv1<5>:
                    /* optional MyMessage (or NULL) */
 MyMessage *mep;
typedef MyMessage *OptionalMyStruct;
```

XDR base types

- All numeric values encoded in big-endian order
- int, unsigned [int], all enums: 4 bytess
- bool: equivalent to "enum bool { FALSE, TRUE }"
- hyper, unsigned hyper: 8 bytes
- float, double, quadruple: 4-, 8-, or 16-byte floating point
- opaque bytes[Len] (fixed-size)
 - Encoded as content + 0-3 bytes padding to make size multiple of 4
- string s<MaxLen>, opaque a<MaxLen> (variable-size)
 - 4-byte length + content + (0-3 bytes) padding

XDR containers and structs

- (Fixed) arrays MyType var[n]
 - Encoded as n copies of MyType
- Vectors MyType var<> or MyType var<n>
 - Can hold variable number (0-n) MyTypes
 - Encoded as 4-byte length followed by that many
 - Empty maximum length means maximum length $2^{32}-1\,\mathrm{MyTypes}$
- Optional data MyType *var
 - Encoded exactly as MyType var<1>
 - Note this means single "present" bit consumes 4 bytes
- struct each field encoded in turn

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XDR union types

union type switch (simple_type which) { case value_A: type_A varA; case value_B: type_B varB; /* ... */ default: void; };

- Must be discriminated, unlike C/C++
- simple_type must be [unsigned] int, bool, or enum
- Wire representation:
 - 4-bytes for which + encoding of selected case
 - Special void type encoded as 0 bytes

Demo

git clone http://cs244b.scs.stanford.edu/xdrdemo.git

- References for demo
 - C++ RPC library: https://github.com/xdrpp/xdrpp
 - Go RPC library: https://github.com/xdrpp/goxdr
 - XDR specification: RFC4506
 - RPC specification: RFC5531

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Asynchronous systems¹

- A theoretical model for distributed systems
 - Consists of a set of agents exchanging messages
 - No bound on message delays
 - No bound on the relative execution speed of agents
 - For convenience, model internal events such as timeouts as special messages, so the "network" controls all timing
- Can't distinguish failed agent from slow network
- Idea of model is to be conservative
 - Want robustness under any possible timing conditions
 - E.g., say backhoe tears fiber, takes a day to repair
 - Could see messages delays a billion times more than usual

¹Unrelated to "asynchronous IO" as used in event-driven systems.

The consensus problem







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- Goal: For multiple agents to agree on an output value
- → Each agent starts with an input value
 - Agents' inputs may differ; any agent's input is okay to output
- Agents communicate following some consensus protocol
 - Use protocol to agree on one of the agent's input values
- Once decided, agents output the chosen value
 - Output is write-once (an agent cannot change its value)

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Properties of a consensus protocol

- A consensus protocol provides safety if...
 - Agreement All outputs produced have the same value, and
 - Validity The output value equals one of the agents' inputs
- A consensus protocol provides liveness if...
 - Termination Eventually non-failed agents output a value
- A consensus protocol provides fault tolerance if...
 - It can survive the failure of an agent at any point
 - Fail-stop protocols handle agent crashes
 - Byzantine-fault-tolerant protocols handle arbitrary agent behavior

Theorem (FLP impossibility result)

No deterministic consensus protocol guarantees all three of safety, liveness, and fault tolerance in an asynchronous system.

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Bivalent states



- → Recall agents chose value 9 in last example
 - But a network outage could look like agent 2 failing
 - If fault-tolerant, Agents 1 & 3 might decide to output 7
 - Once network back, Agent 2 must also output 7

Definition (Bivalent)

An execution of a consensus protocol is in a bivalent state when the network can affect which value agents choose.

Bivalent states




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Univalent and stuck states

Definition (Univalent, Valent)

An execution of a consensus protocol is in a univalent state when only one output value is possible. If that value is *i*, call the state *i*-valent.

Definition (Stuck)

An execution of a [broken] consensus protocol is in a stuck state when one or more non-faulty nodes can never output a value.

- Recall output is write once and all outputs must agree
 - Hence, no output is possible in bivalent state
- If an execution starts in a bivalent state and terminates, it must at some point reach a univalent state

FLP intuition


- Consider a terminating execution of a bivalent system
- Let m be last message received in a bivalent state
 - Call m the execution's deciding message
 - Any terminating execution requires a deciding message
- Suppose the network had delayed m
 - Other messages could cause transitions to other bivalent states
 - Then, receiving *m* might no longer lead to a univalent state
 - In this case, we say m has been neutralized

Overview of FLP proof.

- 1. There are bivalent starting configurations
- 2. The network can neutralize any deciding message
- 3. Hence, the system can remain bivalent in perpetuity

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
There exists a bivalent state



- Assume you could have liveness with an agent failure
- → If all inputs 0, correct agents must eventually output 0
 - Similarly, if all inputs 1, correct agents must eventually output 1
 - Now say we start flipping one input bit at a time
 - Find 0- and 1-valent states differing at only one input
 - Suppose node with this differing input fails
 - By assumption, the system nonetheless reaches consensus
 - Hence output depends on network; at least one state was bivalent

There exists a bivalent state





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
Any message can be neutralized



- \longrightarrow Let m be a deciding message for value 0 from state b
 - Let's assume *m* cannot be neutralized and derive a contradiction
 - Consider a message schedule from b to a 1-valent state
 - If m is on the path, it leads to a bi-valent state (so neutralized)
 - If m is not on the path, append it to the (1-valent) path
 - Apply m to each node on the path
 - Either m will lead to a bi-valent state (neutralized), or it will produce differing univalent states on adjacent nodes c_0 and c_1

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Any message can be neutralized




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
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
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
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
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- \longrightarrow Let m' be the message that transitions between c_0 and c_1
 - If m, m' received by different agents, order won't matter
 - But if delivering both messages yields a 1-valent state, delivering just m can't yield a 0-valent state
 - Hence, m and m' were addressed to the same agent A, making order significant
 - Yet if A slow after c_0 , system must terminate without it

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
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


- → Consider a run that terminates without A
 - Let x_1, \ldots, x_n be the messages received (by nodes other than A)
 - Let e be a univalent state reached during the run
 - Deliver x_1, \ldots, x_n to terminating states after m
 - Since ms and xs received by different nodes, can re-order
 - Means e not univalent (leads to both 0- and 1-valent states)!
 - Contradiction means m must be neutralized somewhere

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
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Coping with FLP

- This class will cover
 - Many systems that require consensus
 - Many techniques for consensus
- Safety is generally pretty important
- But can reasonably weaken liveness requirement
 - Termination not guaranteed doesn't mean it won't happen
 - If your algorithm prevents completely stuck states ... can often make it terminate "in practice"
- Can weaken asynchronous system assumption
- Can make agents non-deterministic
 - Have all nodes flip a coin to pick value—might all pick same value
 - Make it intractable for network to "guess" pathological delivery 100% accurately in perpetuity